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Richard T. Ainsworth is an adjunct professor at the Boston University
graduate tax program and the New York University graduate tax program.
Musaad Alwohaibi is a professor of international taxation law at the College of
Law and Political Science, King Saud University. Andrew J. Leahey is a tax and
technology attorney in New Jersey. Yijin Li is an attorney at DeHeng Law
Offices in Beijing. Haseena Rahman is the director of the Special AntiCorruption Secretariat at the President’s Office in Kabul.
In this article, the first in a three-part series, the authors discuss the choices
Afghanistan faces as it implements its first VAT and, in particular, how it can
prepare to fight VAT fraud. They review the problem of VAT invoice fraud,
examine the traditional use of invoice matching to combat the problem, and
begin to consider how technology can help, including the potential use of
business process reengineering.
In the summer of 1990, two groundbreaking
articles on business process reengineering (BPR)
captured the attention of academics and business
professionals alike: The publication by lead
author Thomas H. Davenport, a professor of
information technology at Babson College, and his
coauthor James E. Short of the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology appeared in the MIT Sloan
1
Management Review; and Michael Hammer, a

professor of computer science at MIT, published
2
his article in the Harvard Business Review. The
publications were coordinated, and the lead
authors had decades of both academic and
technology consulting experience. BPR is a
management strategy that analyzes IT-intensive
workflow designs and business processes within
an organization. Initially, BPR was used to help
private companies radically restructure around IT.

1

Davenport and Short, “The New Industrial Engineering:
Information Technology and Business Process Redesign,” 31(4) Sloan
Mgmt. Rev. 11 (Summer 1990).

2

Hammer, “Re-Engineering Work: Don’t Automate, Obliterate,” Harv.
Bus. Rev. 104 (July-August 1990).
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Since then, BPR has changed and expanded the
way we think about IT. By 1997 the U.S.
government was using BPR to help guide the
3
restructuring of large public institutions.
Hammer’s wording tends to be harsh, but his
commitment to the field runs deep. He advocates
obliterating all forms of work that do not add
organizational value. Specifically, Hammer
opposes the use of technology simply to automate
older work models. Far too often, he observes, IT
is used to automate existing processes without
management taking the time to consider what
could be accomplished if IT was treated as a core
business attribute.
Davenport doubles down on Hammer’s
insights. He emphasizes a holistic focus on
business objectives and strives to identify how IT
processes relate to those goals. He supports using
IT for full-scale re-creation rather than for the
iterative optimization of subprocesses.
Afghanistan plans to implement a 10 percent
VAT beginning December 21. To do so, the
country will have to make significant workflow
design and business process decisions. There will
be problems, of course, but there are also great
opportunities. The question for Afghanistan is not
whether it will apply information technology in
VAT administration, but rather how it will design
workflows and business processes given today’s
technology. In an article published earlier this
year, Bilal Hassan (an official with Pakistan’s
Federal Board of Revenue) underscored the
importance of IT in the Afghan VAT, stating:
Strengthening the administrative capacity
of the tax authorities and using
information technology (IT) will be crucial
4
for ensuring VAT compliance.
This article, the first in a three-part series,
undertakes a limited, comparative study of VAT
invoices. It applies BPR principles to the invoice

function of a credit-invoice VAT, and it offers an
assessment that looks at where the leading edge of
this element of VAT practice is today. Our hope is
that this analysis proves useful to officials in
Afghanistan or another jurisdiction that is
adopting a new VAT.
The Reality of VAT Fraud: An Overview
The Afghan VAT is a standard credit-invoice
VAT of European vintage. Like all credit-invoice
VATs, it operates on an invoice-matching
principle: The input VAT — paid by the buyer and
referenced on a purchase invoice — should be
directly traceable to an identical amount of output
VAT collected by the seller and counterreferenced on the sales invoice.5 If everything
matches on all invoices, for all transactions in the
jurisdiction, there is no fraud — or, more
accurately, there should be no fraud. As part 2 of
this series will note, specifically in the context of
the Shanghai case, sometimes fraudsters use
invoice matching to disguise fraud.
Given the number of transactions and the
amount of VAT involved, we can be sure that
there will be fraud attempts and successes in
Afghanistan. In 2017 the VAT gap in Europe
totaled €137.5 billion, and it is safe to say that the
vast majority was a result of fraud.6 The methods
used to carry out VAT frauds are no secret. Just
like it does in the EU, fraud will occur on both
sides of Afghan transactions with fraudsters
using fake invoices on the purchase side and
missing traders on the sales side. The goal is to
minimize fraud — expecting to eliminate it may
be unrealistic, especially for a new VAT
jurisdiction — and technology can help.
On the purchasing side, fraudsters use fake
invoices to secure refunds of VAT that was never
paid on supplies that were never bought. In
contrast, supply-side fraudsters make real sales

5

3

See, e.g., U.S. General Accounting Office, Business Process
Reengineering Assessment Guide (May 1997).
4

Hassan, “The Challenge of VAT Implementation in Afghanistan,”
30(2) Int’l VAT Monitor 80 (Mar. 2019). Notably, however, Hassan views
invoice workflows and processes in terms of matching rather than a
unitary digital invoice:
The tax authorities need to implement the VAT system strategically
and ensure effective supervision through audit and fraud control
measures with the aid of obtaining information from the cross-matching
of data. [Emphasis added.]

1212

See Graham Harrison and Russell Krelove, “VAT Refunds: A Review
of Country Experience,” IMF Working Paper WP/05/218 (Nov. 2005)
(noting “the theoretical possibility that a tax administration should be
able to cross-check all purchases and sales invoices to validate VAT
credit claims (as well as identify undisclosed sales)”). See also Alan
Schenk, Victor Thuronyi, and Wei Cui, Value Added Tax: A Comparative
Approach (2015) (on the centrality of the VAT invoice to a European-style
VAT).
6

Center for Social and Economic Research, “Study and Reports on
the VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States: 2019 Final Report,” TAXUD/
2015/CC/131 (Sept. 4, 2019).
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and collect real VAT, but when the time comes for
a return to be filed, either selective transactions
are omitted or the supplier itself disappears,
taking the VAT along with it. In either case,
government auditors spend considerable time
and effort proving fraud — after the fact — by
examining paired invoices. This is the invoicematching principle in practice at the auditor level.
If Y purchased what X sold, then the invoice
records on both sides should match. Fake
invoices, missing transactions, and missing
traders point to fraud.
Invoice matching is often the most essential
tool for auditors in a fraud investigation. When
compliance was not in real time — when it
involved paper invoices and paper returns filed
one to three months after the underlying
transactions occurred — a suspected fraud case
meant government auditors had to sift through
piles of paper invoices to check for mismatches.
The need to automate the invoice-matching
function was obvious.
Examples of Invoice Fraud
Throughout this series of articles, we will use
three examples to illustrate differences among
VAT systems. The first two examples involve
reasonably common fraud patterns: Abdul
Majeed’s fake invoice fraud, which totaled
£119,624, and Sandeep and Pardeep Dosanjh’s
three sequential missing trader frauds
(respectively totaling €31,244,175; €9,795,086; and
£11.7 million). The third example is from
Shanghai (CNY 250 million, roughly $35 million);
it involves a newer kind of fraud that hasn’t been
paid much attention yet, but it is probably more
common in practice than observers realize. The
Shanghai fraud example will be considered in
part 2 of this series.
Example 1: Abdul Majeed
Majeed served as the company secretary for
two fashion firms located in the United Kingdom.
His fraud was decidedly low-tech: It involved the
production of numerous fake invoices, and it
escaped the detection of HM Revenue & Customs
for nearly eight years. Majeed’s fraud was
successful, in part, because of natural mistakes
stemming from the similarity of the names of the
companies he used for four of those years: Majtex

Ltd. (incorporated April 23, 2007) and Majtex
International Ltd. (incorporated May 7, 2009)
were both VAT registered, the Companies House
had assigned each entity a number (the
registration system for limited companies in the
United Kingdom), and they had different physical
addresses. But Majeed’s success was also the
result of strategic manipulation. He was
remarkably good at selectively doubling input
VAT deductions.
7
An HMRC release describes the fraud, and
additional details from other public documents
make HMRC’s rough sketch clearer. HMRC
indicates that Majeed used legitimate suppliers’
invoices as templates to create fake sales and
purchase documents. The fraud, which involved
three basic fact patterns, occurred from April 2006
through April 2014. This timespan can be broken
down into the following four periods:
• April 2006-April 23, 2007: Before the
incorporation of either of his businesses,
Majeed appears to have been engaged in the
fashion textile business as an individual
trader. HMRC indicates that Majeed first
employed fake purchase invoices in this
context to obtain excess input credits.
• April 23, 2007-May 7, 2009: Majeed
continued to produce fake invoices after
incorporating Majtex Ltd.
• May 7, 2009-October 22, 2013: During this
period, Majeed operated brother and sister
companies — namely, Majtex Ltd. and
Majtex International Ltd. The pattern of fake
invoices became more complicated with
purchase and sales invoices passing
between his own companies and disguising
other fake transactions, some of which were
international.
• October 22, 2013-April 2014: In this final
period, HMRC had discovered the fraud
and asked Majeed to come clean and explain
invoice irregularities. The offer, a
contractual disclosure facility, would have
prevented a criminal investigation if Majeed
had responded to it in good faith within 60
days. Instead, he ignored HMRC’s request

7

HMRC, “Clothing Wholesaler Sentenced for VAT Fraud” (Oct. 9,
2018).
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and dissolved Majtex Ltd. without
admitting fraud. HMRC opened a full
criminal investigation, which resulted in
Majeed’s pleading guilty in Manchester
Crown Court, a two-year suspended
sentence, community service, and various
financial compensation orders reaching
£120,000.
Majeed’s First Fact Pattern
Majeed purchases textiles from U.K. suppliers
in his own capacity and later through Majtex Ltd.
He pays U.K. VAT and receives a valid VAT
invoice. This valid invoice is cloned, and Majeed
creates a second invoice for essentially the same
purchase. On his VAT return, Majeed records
deductions for all the VAT that all the invoices —
genuine and cloned — suggest was paid, thus
deducting more input VAT than he actually paid.
Majeed’s cloning technique did not involve
exact replicas; he included minor differences in
the cloned invoices to disguise the duplication.
Majeed’s Second Fact Pattern
This pattern is similar to the first. A legitimate
purchase invoice is cloned to produce an
additional, fake purchase invoice. The fake
invoice references a fake textile purchase by
Majtex Ltd., which that company then resells to
Majtex International Ltd. Finally, a third fake
invoice is produced indicating that the fake textile
purchase is exported, thus resulting in a refund
for VAT that was never paid. Majeed also ran the
same pattern in reverse, cloning Majtex
International Ltd.’s purchase before making a fake
sale to Majtex Ltd.
Two frauds occur in the original version of this
second pattern. First, Majtex Ltd. takes a double
input VAT deduction for a single purchase.
Second, Majtex International Ltd. requests a VAT
refund for a fake zero-rated export. Importantly, if
Majtex International Ltd. was audited, it could
provide its purchase invoice, and the group could
also supply Majtex Ltd.’s matching sale and
earlier purchase invoices.
This second Majeed fact pattern shows
fraudsters’ tendency to construct fake commercial
patterns of matched invoices to obscure the real
fraud. The Shanghai fraud, discussed in part 2,
involves the same thing on a much larger scale —
$35 million.

1214

Majeed’s Third Fact Pattern
The third pattern was Majeed’s mistake.
HMRC discovered his invoice frauds when he
began cloning import invoices.
Majtex International Ltd. imported clothing
from outside the EU. It paid import VAT to
customs at the port of entry and received a
customs form (C79) as proof of payment. Majeed
would then clone the (Majtex International Ltd.)
invoice and, relying on the similar names, pretend
that Majtex Ltd. had made an import. Both
companies claimed input VAT deductions based
on a single import and the same VAT payment.
Majeed supported both the real invoice to Majtex
International Ltd. and the fake import invoice to
Majtex Ltd. with the same C79. However, customs
uncovered the fraud using its C79 cross-check
program.
Figure 1 diagrams each of Majeed’s fact
patterns.
Example 2: The Dosanjhs’ Fraud Bot
This example involves missing trader fraud. It
is different in almost all respects from Majeed’s
fake invoice fraud. The Dosanjh fraud is a fully
automated, fast-moving, large-loss fraud, and it
involves a tightly knit criminal gang of family
members. Fraud chains are designed to last days,
normally ending before the time for the filing of
the first VAT return. In contrast, Majeed’s fraud
was a low-tech, one-man, fully manual cloning
fraud, and it produced modest loss-to-revenue
returns for nearly a decade.
The Dosanjhs created a fraud bot that needed
very little human intervention. Fraud bots are
most effective with intangible (digital) properties
such as CO2 emissions permits, gas, electric, voice
over internet protocol rights, and telephone
calling cards. In this case, the bot could be (and, in
some instances, was) operated from entirely
outside the creators’ home country (the United
Kingdom).
Missing trader frauds typically involve a
chain of companies controlled by a fraudster and
his associates. With a fully operational fraud bot
this control is remote. The first company imports
a supply — CO2 permits, in the Dosanjh example
— and resells it along the chain for a small profit
at each stage, with the last company exporting the
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supply. Each company pays a small net VAT, with
two exceptions:
• The first exception is the initial company in
the chain. It is supposed to remit a large VAT
payment on import using a reverse charge.
However — and this is the heart of one of
the most common VAT frauds — the
company does not perform this reverse
charge and goes missing before its VAT
return is due. The same company also keeps
all the VAT it receives on its forward sales
(undiminished by a reverse charge).
• The other exception is the exporting
company. This entity can apply for a refund
because consumption is expected to happen
outside the jurisdiction.
The profit, which is typically split using a
formula, is the combined total minus expenses
and the small net VAT paid along the chain.

In the Dosanjh case, which resulted in
multiple appellate decisions:
The proceeds were swiftly moved offshore
into “banking platforms,” in particular,
commercial banks in Hong Kong,
Australia, and New Zealand. These
operated in a manner described as being
“analogous to a solicitor’s client account.”
All the money went into one account but
there were internal ledgers used to
allocate it between the “sub-accounts” of
the traders. This meant that the true nature
of the transfers was effectively disguised
8
and difficult to detect.

8

R. v. Dosanjh, [2013] EWCA Crim 2366. See also R. v. Chada, [2016]
EWCA Crim 1955.

TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL, VOLUME 100, NOVEMBER 30, 2020
®
Electronic
copy
available
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3819431
For more Tax
Notes
International
content, please visit www.taxnotes.com.

1215

© 2020 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.

TAX TECH

Court decisions identify Sandeep Dosanjh and
his second cousin Pardeep Dosanjh as the “prime
organizers and main beneficiaries” of this
technologically sophisticated missing trader
fraud. Three rapidly executed, sequential
permutations of this fraud cost the U.K. Treasury
a total of €52,739,261. On August 19, 2009, an
attempt was made to arrest all the conspirators,
but Pardeep Dosanjh fled the jurisdiction before
he could be arrested. As of the drafting of this
article, he had not been extradited (papers are
outstanding).
The technology that enables this fraud works
like digital origami. Fraud chains are put into place
and then folded back up and moved away when no
longer needed. As the appeals court explained in
2013, “The chains and money laundering
arrangements were all set up in advance so that
new companies and new banking arrangements
could be used as and when required without
causing any disruption in the fraud.”
When it identified the Dosanjh fraud, HMRC
tried to stop it in four different ways. The first
three efforts involved blocking foreign money
transfers, blocking domestic trading activity, and
zero-rating all trade in CO2 permits. The final
remedy was arresting the Dosanjh cousins and all
known associates and holding them in jail
without bail for a year. The goal of the arrests and
detentions may have been to secure the Dosanjhs’
technology, but there are indications that the
technology had already been transferred to other
fraudsters — notably gangs in Germany, some of
which had long U.K. associations.
It is apparent that even the final remedy of
arresting everyone and confining them to jail cells
was not a complete solution. New associates were
easily found to continue the fraud. When it
sentenced the responsible parties in the third
iteration of the chain in 2016, the court noted that
“none of these three defendants was involved in
that first fraud” — that is, none of the defendants
involved in the third chain was involved in chains
one or two. The real problem isn’t the people —
it’s the technology, the fraud programming, and
the system of digital origami that allows operators
to move any entity or individual in or out of the
system on demand. The fraud continues while the
operators change. The real fraudster is the fraud
bot, and one of the biggest dangers is the fact that
it can be controlled from anywhere in the world.
1216

HMRC’s first attempt to stop the Dosanjhs’
first fraud chain involved asking the Hong Kong
banking authorities to disrupt the payment
platform. It worked, but only briefly. The
fraudsters quickly moved the payment platform
to New Zealand and changed each of the
companies in the fraud chain. There was no gap in
fraud operations. The second fraud chain
overlapped with the first for six days, from April
2 to April 8, 2009, and then the new chain
continued on.
The first chain operated for 78 days before the
second chain took over, using different
companies, different directors, and different
overseas banking arrangements. It lasted 34 days.
When HMRC identified the switch, it decided not
to wait for New Zealand’s banking authorities to
shut down the second chain’s payment platform.
Instead, HMRC shut down the penultimate
company in second chain, the company that
supplied CO2 permits to the Dosanjhs’ final
company (KO Brokers Ltd.) and was poised to
either export or sell permits domestically. This
entity, AGH Associates Ltd., is commonly called
the final buffer.
After a month-long pause — notably, the same
month when the BlueNext exchange in Paris was
shut down for rampant CO2 fraud and when
France exempted CO2 permits from VAT — a third
Dosanjh chain began operating in the United
Kingdom. Once again, the Dosanjhs’ fraud bot
had simply substituted different companies,
different directors, and different overseas
banking arrangements. The fraud continued.
Even the final link in the chain was changed to a
new company that was owned by a new fraudster,
a third Dosanjh cousin, Gurmail Dosanjh. The
third chain lasted for 31 days and, as the 2016
decision reports, “trading on every working day
in July 2009, the third chain resulted in a loss to
the Revenue of £11.7 million.”
HMRC realized that it could not stop the
Dosanjhs’ fraud bot. The only effective course of
action was to change the law and zero-rate CO2
permits. This change took effect August 1, 2009.9

9

HMRC, “VAT: Zero Rating of Emissions Allowances With Effect
From 31 July 2009,” Brief 46/90 (July 30, 2009); and David Connett,
“Carbon Credit Scam Would Have Cost Britain £2bn,” The Independent,
June 24, 2012.
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With this change, the Dosanjhs’ fraud bot finally
stopped operating — at least in the United
Kingdom. This leads one to ask: Where could it
have been installed next? That, however, is
beyond the scope of this article.
Figure 2 diagrams the three Dosanjh fraud
10
chains in the United Kingdom.
Can Invoice Matching Solve VAT Fraud?
The credit-invoice VAT is designed around
invoice matching. Advocates of the system say
11
invoice matching makes the tax self-enforcing.

However, with 2017 data12 indicating a €137.5
billion (down from €145.5 billion) VAT gap in the
EU, many feel that this “self-enforcement” is
overstated.13 Visible oversight is still needed for an
efficient and effective VAT. Normally, audits —
real and physical or remote and digital — are
needed.14
Normally, an auditor’s first step in a VAT
fraud case would be to attempt to match invoices.
Invoice matching would detect Majeed’s fake
invoices; they matched nothing, so the fraud was

10

For diagrams including the major commercial purchasers of CO2
permits from the Dosanjh chains and the various payment platforms, see
Richard T. Ainsworth, “VAT Fraud Mutation, Part 1: ‘Push’ Missing
Trader Fraud and Dosanjh,” Tax Notes Int’l, Feb. 8, 2016, p. 535.
11

See, e.g., European Union, “Green Paper on the Future of VAT —
Towards a Simpler, More Robust and Efficient VAT System,” COM(2010)
695 final (2010). The classic academic study advancing this principle is
Cedric Sandford and Michael Godwin, “VAT Administration and
Compliance in Britain,” in Value Added Taxation in Developing Countries
(1990).

12

Center for Social and Economic Research, supra note 6.

13

Ben Terra, “The European Court of Justice and the Principle of
Prohibiting Abusive Practices in VAT,” in GST in Retrospect and Prospect
(2007). See also Joep Swinkels, “Carousel Fraud in the European Union,”
19(2) Int’l VAT Monitor 103 (2008).
14

See Arindam Das-Gupta and Ira N. Gang, “Value Added Tax
Evasion, Auditing and Transactions Matching,” Rutgers University WP
96-07 (1996).
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detected. Invoice matching would also identify
Dosanjh’s missing traders — the invoices that the
buffer entities received when they made
purchases from missing traders would have no
match. Again, the fraud was detected.
Applied case by case, invoice matching works
well. But it is not a complete answer for all
situations; it takes time, and invoice matching an
entire VAT system is a daunting task. The process
picks up clerical mistakes, minor errors, and
numerical transpositions in manual entry
documents. Jurisdictions that have tried to
manually match all invoices — the IMF puts
Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, China, Indonesia,
Korea, and Taiwan in this group — have failed.
However, in the 1990s, these failures were not
seen as a defeat. Instead, the efforts were seen as
indications that victory was at hand. Supporters
believed that if programming was perfected and
computers became faster, then true selfenforcement could be — and would be —
realized. As a World Bank study by Arindam
Das-Gupta and Ira N. Gang concluded:
What is surprising, however, is that even if
the STA (State Tax Authority) is inefficient
in carrying out audits, intensive crossmatching under the assumption of a
known technology can lead to fullcompliance with the VAT as a
consequence of self-enforcement. This
situation may become possible when the
cost of cross-matching is low due to the
15
deployment of high-speed computers.
Given what we know now about BPR, this is
an extraordinary statement. Can the VAT have full
compliance through self-enforcement, if intensive
cross-matching (a standard audit practice) is
applied with a known program? Is access to highspeed computers the only condition? Is the right
answer getting faster computers to replicate
auditors? This is not BPR.
Thus, we arrive at the 1990s intersection of
VAT administration and BPR. In 1996 Das-Gupta

15

Id.

1218

and Gang reached a conclusion that is the exact
opposite of what Hammer and Davenport
hypothesized in 1990. There is a fork in the road
ahead. There is a considerable difference between
the idea that “all we need is higher-speed
computers” and a philosophy that says “what we
need is re-engineering of business processes
around the present capabilities of IT.”
What is even more striking for purposes of
this article is that the automation of a manual
invoice-matching processes is Hammer’s primary
BPR example. Hammer’s paper applies directly to
the invoice-matching problem in VAT.
Hammer tells the story of Ford. In the 1980s
Ford dedicated 500 employees in its accounts
payable department to an invoice-matching
function. The company believed that automation
— that is, faster computers combined with more
efficient and effective programming — would
allow faster matching. It expected to achieve a
headcount reduction of 20 percent (down to 400
employees) in the team. But when Ford saw that
Mazda had only committed five employees to the
same invoice-matching function, the company
scrapped its automation plans. Radical change
was necessary, not just the automation of existing
processes.
Ford applied 1980s BPR to commercial invoice
matching. It didn’t just automate existing
processes, it rethought the invoice-matching
function, opted for radical change, and went to an
online database. Ford called it “invoiceless
processing”:
Ford has achieved a 75 percent reduction
in head count, not the 20 percent it would
have gotten with a conventional program.
And since there are no discrepancies
between the financial record and the
physical record, material control is
simpler and financial information is more
16
accurate.
The remaining articles in this series will
examine two groups of countries and then
consider the questions that those comparisons

16

Hammer, supra note 2.
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raise for Afghanistan. The first group of countries
(South Korea, China, and India) seem to have
followed Das-Gupta and Gang — that is, they
applied faster computer technology to previously
established processes. The second group of
countries (Fiji, Samoa, and the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia) seem to have listened to Hammer and
Davenport — that is, they tried to break free from
the inertia of old processes by rethinking and
reengineering the business process of matching
invoices.
Afghanistan faces a choice.
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